account other federal policies that have a substantial role in concentrating poverty" and the shared responsibility of state and local government agencies for racial discrimination and concentrated poverty. , 1993) . David James identifies another federal program whose powerful, although perhaps unintended, consequence was segregatory: "The implementation of the New Deal farm programs and succeeding farm policies that drastically reduced the acres devoted to cotton and tobacco in the South is the best example of a policy with unintended ghetto-building consequences." James, supra note 4, at 409 n.7.
1" School policies, for example, have been a powerful cause of housing segregation, which in turn concentrates poverty. Segregation in public education creates segregated housing because only in desegregated school systems will whites remain in or move to neighborhoods of significant minority population. See Gary Orfield, Ghettoization and Its Alternatives, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 161, 192 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985) [hereinafter Orfield, Ghettoization] (" [T] here is considerable evidence that metropolitan school desegregation plans produce more integrated residential areas over time .... since there is no fear of ghettoization of the local schools and no incentive to move to a whiter school elsewhere."); Gary Orfield, Housing as a Justification for Resegregating Schools: Consequences of Changing Judicial Interpretations 46-80 (April 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also JULIET SALTMAN, A FRAGILE MOVEMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION 396 (1990) ("Unless racial balance is empirically present in a neighborhood's public schools, a majority of whites with children will not perceive that neighborhood as a desirable one and will not move into it.").
Other local decisions that cause segregation include the exercise of development controls, the provision of municipal facilities and services, and similar activities funded under the Community Development Block Grant program. See Yale Rabin, The Roots of Segregation in the Eighties: The Role of Local Government Actions, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 208, 212-24 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987) (discussing specific local government policies that have had a segregative effect); see also THOMAS L. PHILPOTr, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO: IMMIGRANTS, BLACKS, AND REFORMERS IN CHICAGO, 1880-1930, at 304 (1991) ("Public officials.., did their best to locate and administer clinics and dispensaries, parks and playgrounds, swimming pools and beaches, libraries, schools, and other facilities in a way that would hold the mingling of blacks and whites to a minimum.").
I. THE CAUSES OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM
Schill and Wachter assert that the federal housing program that "has generated the most intense pattern of concentrated poverty" is the public housing program. 1 3 This is true only in the narrow sense that public housing serves the largest number of poor people. More poor people live in public housing than in housing associated with any other government program because poor people generally are excluded from the other housing programs. Much to the credit of the public housing program, it has been open and hospitable to very poor people when every other government housing program has excluded or severely limited their participation. 4 To some extent, very poor people are excluded from other programs because the programs provide only a shallow subsidy, so that very poor people would have to pay extremely high percentages of their incomes for rent. (This is true, for example, of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program and interest-credit programs such as sections 221(d)(3) 15 'Y DEBATE 417, 434 (1993) . Newman and Schnare conclude:
The most striking finding of this research is that the system of housing assistance channels different types of households with children into different housing programs. Households with the highest incomes, lowest welfare dependency rates, highest educational achievement, fewest children, and smallest concentration of female heads are most likely to end up in privately owned assisted stock. Households applying for assistance directly to PHAs are likewise sorted into groups, and the most disadvantaged end up in public housing.
Id.
15 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1988) . 16 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1988). 'v In general, discrimination on the basis of income source is not prohibited. There are two federal exceptions. First, landlords who already rent to Section 8 tenants are prohibited from discriminating against other Section 8 applicants. See 42 19951 racial, ethnic or other illegal discrimination. Even more telling, there are other federal housing programs that offer deep subsidies and that are, in theory, as available to very poor people as public housing. The Section 8 program, for example, has essentially the same income eligibility and preference requirements as does public housing, but the incomes of Section 8 residents are higher than the incomes of public housing residents." 8 This is because very poor people often are excluded from Section 8. Similarly, the Section 202 program for the elderly and handicapped is deeply subsidized and can serve very poor people, but the income levels in Section 202 housing are above the levels in public housing.' 9 We need to ask not what it is about public housing that makes it open to very poor people, but what it is about the other federal housing programs that keeps very poor people out of them.
A. Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Public and Other Housing Programs as a Cause of Concentrated Poverty
The first and most important point to make is that public housing and the other federal housing programs have been used to create and maintain racial discrimination and rigid segregation which, as Massey and Denton show, concentrates poverty. U.S.C. § 1437f(t) (1988) . Second, Low Income Housing Tax Credit sponsors are prohibited from discriminating against Section 8 certificate holders under I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) (Supp. V 1993) . Even in the fewjurisdictions in which it is illegal to discriminate on the basis of source of income, such discrimination is common. 
INTENTIONAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The federal government intentionally established the public housing program on a dejure racially segregated basis. 2 Schill and Wachter note that the federal public housing program gave considerable authority over siting decisions to local communities, enabling some to exclude public housing altogether and allowing others to confine public housing to high-density developments on small sites.
2 1 The historical and legal literature establishes that the single most powerful explanation for this exclusion and confinement of family public housing has been hostility to people of color, particularly blacks; 22 SINCE 1930 SINCE , at 93 (1973 (explaining that "they had the difficult choice of voting for nondiscrimination and assuring defeat of the legislation, or voting against desegregation and saving the bill"). A timely illustration of intentional segregation is provided in a suit recently filed in Baltimore, Maryland, challenging the intentional and continued segregation in the public housing program there. A federal report on McCulloh Homes, the "colored housing project," recites that adjacent projects were planned to "offer a splendid barrier against the encroachment of colored" people into a "good white residential neighborhood." See Class Action Complaint at 17, Thompson v. HUD (D. Md. filed Jan. 31, 1995) .
HOUSING CRISIS
2 The U.S. Housing Act restricted the placement of public housing to communities that would enter into "cooperation agreements" with local public housing authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e)(2) (1988).
The "cooperation agreement" requirement has been a principal tool of white communities that wish to exclude public housing. See POLIKOFF, supra note 20, at 12 ("By simply refusing to make [a cooperation agreement], local officials could veto a proposed project .... [and] had the power to decide whether public housing was to be built at all in their communities . undo that segregation, to eliminate its vestiges "root and branch."
2 "
Racial discrimination in other federal housing programs has helped to confine blacks to public housing. The Section 8 Existing Housing Assistance Program is administered in a racially discriminatory way, with HUD's complicity: 27 blacks in public housing or on the public housing waiting list are told that they cannot apply for Section 8 without losing their place on the public housing list; they are refused access to Section 8 subsidies in the suburbs through the employment of residency preferences and other discriminatory mechanisms.
2 " Why are Section 202 projects predominantly white? Why do black elderly and handicapped people more often live in public housing than in Section 202 housing? Very poor whites have options that very poor blacks lack. While whites are only 35% of the public housing population, they hold 45% of the certificates/ vouchers and reside in 57% of the subsidized, project-based housing.
29
The HUD-assisted programs' affirmative marketing regulations are ignored." 0 The federal government's largest contemporary subsidized housing production program-the Low 26 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) . The obligation is imposed in the school cases, notably Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38, and is extended to housing by Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284,305-06 (1976) . See also Roberta Achtenberg, Keynote Address, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 REv. , 1193 REv. (1995 (stating that "successive administrations ... have repeatedly missed opportunities to combat discrimination").
27 Minority recipients of and applicants to public housing assistance in Buffalo have filed a class action against HUD and the Buffalo housing authorities alleging racially discriminatory administration of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. See Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1994 
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Income Housing Tax Credit-operates without any civil rights regulations and without information about the race of residents and the extent of segregation in or near project sites." 1 Both HUD and the President have acknowledged the federal government's failure affirmatively to advocate measures to promote fair housing.
3 2 I consider that the single most important reason why poor people are concentrated in conventional public housing is that racial discrimination continues to move poor people out of federally aided housing other than pubic housing. I proceed, however, to consider the other suggestions made by Professors Schill and Wachter.
B. Bad Physical Conditions in Public Housing as a Cause of Concentrated Poverty
I completely agree with Schill and Wachter that bad physical conditions in public housing promote concentrated poverty. When public housing is substandard, people who have options other than public housing will live elsewhere. 33 The factors that create bad physical conditions, therefore, encourage poverty concentration. Those factors include: the systemic omission of a capital-replacement reserve from the public housing program; consistently inadequate funding for major repair and rehabilitation, whether termed modernization or comprehensive improvement; 34 inadequate definition and funding of operating subsidies; and deplorable management and shirking of responsibility by several public housing authorities (PHAs), with HUD refusal to use its statutory authority to correct the conditions. 12 See Achtenberg, supra note 26, at 1194-95; see also Exec. Order No. 12892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (1994 (establishing the President's Fair Housing Council, a group headed by the Secretary of HUD, which is to coordinate and oversee the implementation of federal fair housing programs); HUD's Responses, supra note 24, at 76 (admitting that HUD "did not fulfill HUD's obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (5) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968").
3' See Newman & Schnare, supra note 14, at 426-27 ("[P]rivately owned assisted stock is in better shape than public housing or the stock of privately owned housing occupied by certificate and voucher holders."). " HUD has the statutory authority to take over housing authorities that default predominantly minority public housing projects are both the results of racial discrimination and an effective barrier to desegregation.
C. Federal Income Eligibility, Preference Requirements, and Rent Regulations as Causes of Concentrated Poverty in Public Housing

Income Eligibility
Contrary to Schill and Wachter's suggestion, federal income eligibility limits do not explain the extreme poverty concentrations that exist in public housing. The income limits are set at 80% and 50% of HUD's adjusted area median family income (HAMFI): "low income" is defined as 80% of HAMFI and "very low income" is defined as 50% of HAMFI 6 The national average HAMFI in 1989 was $34,800. The very-low-income level, 50% of HAMFI, was $17,400. The median household income of public housing residents was approximately $6571, one-third of the very-low-income eligibility level. 3 7 Public housing incomes fall far below not only the income eligibility limit but also the incomes in other programs with similar eligibility standards. 38 Thus, something other than income eligibility explains why the very poorest people live in public housing, rather than in other housing that has the same or similar income eligibility requirements.
on their obligations, including the obligation to maintain decent conditions. HUD, however, has been very reluctant to use this authority, leaving the courts to impose receiverships. See, e.g., Velez v. Cisneros, 850 F. Supp. 1257 , 1278 -79 (E.D. Pa. 1994 (holding that public housing tenants had a private right of action against HUD as the operator of a local housing authority that engaged in de facto demolition of public housing projects); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 400 N.E.2d 1231 , 1254 (Mass. 1980 (upholding the imposition of receivership on the board of a city housing authority after the board failed to perform its duties properly). HUD has generally refused to exercise its statutory authority to take over PHAs that were failing in their obligations to residents.
56 For the definition of "low income," see supra note 5. 
Preferences
Federal preferences may play a role in bringing more very poor people into public housing. The preferences are designed for persons who have been displaced by government action, who live in substandard housing, or who pay more than 50% of their income for rent." Eligibility for federal preferences-that is, worst-case housing need-is much more common among households at approximately 35% of area median income than among those households with incomes between 35% and 50%.40 If PHAs follow the law, most people who are admitted into public housing will be those who hold federal preferences. 41 Nonetheless, there are several reasons why it is unlikely that the preference scheme has had substantial responsibility for concentrating extremely poor people in public housing.
First, federal preferences apply only to some new admissions, not to all public housing units. 42 Second, PHAs are allowed to "rank" preferences, as well as to define the categories, and are able to use verification requirements to reduce the likelihood that very poor people will be able to gain admission. While applicants with legal representation may be successful in overcoming some such barriers, few applicants will have such aid. 45 Perhaps most importantly, communities have been permitted to give highest preference to the federal preference holders who also have local preferences. Thus, persons who satisfy local residency preferences are admitted before people from other areas. 46 Third, and perhaps conclusively, the Section 8 projects and the Section 8 certificate and voucher programs, which have substantially the same preference requirements as the conventional public housing program, have average and median income levels that are much higher than those in public housing.
7 Plainly, the agencies and sponsors administering those programs are finding higherincome residents who satisfy the federal preference system. The preference requirements, therefore, do not fully explain why most very poor people are admitted into public housing.
Rent Regulation
Rent standards may contribute to concentrating poverty in public housing. From 1969 to 1981, public housing rents were limited, in general, to 25% of household income. In 1981, Congress directed an increase to 30% of household income." This change, to some degree, made it more attractive for those with other options to leave, thus concentrating poverty in public housing. To some extent, this has been offset by the authorization to public housing agencies to apply rent ceilings and allow higher-income HUD economists, however, hypothesize that increasing rent charges from 25% to 30% of income "probably had greater effect" on inducing higher-income residents to leave public housing than did the 1981 limitation of admission to those with 50% of area median income.°D
. Procedural Rights as Causes of Concentrated Poverty
Since the 1960s, federal, state, and local courts, legislatures, and agencies have accorded public housing applicants and residents a variety of procedural and substantive "rights." 5 Schill and Wachter assert that "the resulting loss of PHA freedom to select and evict tenants has contributed to the concentration of poverty within public housing." 5 "
They offer no empirical support for this assertion; what theoretical justification they offer is deficient for the reasons that follow. PHA's failure to implement grievance procedure regulations). In general, unless public housing applicants and residents have counsel, which seldom is the case, they are unlikely to know what "rights" they theoretically possess and are unlikely to be able to enforce those "rights."
Public housing applicants and residents have many rights "on paper," including of course the "right" not to be subject to discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. We know that discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin occurs now at housing authorities; only recently, the New York City Housing Authority settled a case in which the U.S. Department ofJustice accused it of discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin, assigning white applicants to "white only" projects. See Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 839 F.
Supp. 215,217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
When we know that this kind of racial discrimination was occurring in New York in 1990, can we doubt that applicants and residents are deprived of many other "rights" in public housing programs through the country?
52 Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1299. This is an instance of the fallacious identification of poverty with behavior. "Problem" tenants are not necessarily very poor tenants. Poor elderly people, for example, are not considered "problem" residents. There is no rational or empirical support for the proposition that very poor families will be "problem" residents.
" The author of this Paper is proud to have been one of the legion of legal services, civil rights, and civil liberties advocates who worked to secure and maintain these procedural rights. This certainly affords her particular knowledge of the subject. Readers will have to determine for themselves whether the association affects the author's judgment on this issue.
Applicants' procedural rights are essentially the same for all HUD housing programs; the procedural rights cannot be the reason why more very poor people are in public housing. 54 Applicants for all the HUD-assisted housing programs are entitled to have their applications measured against known "ascertainable standards" and to have their applications considered "in some reasonable manner."" 5 Applicants who are rejected are entitled to be given notice stating the reasons for the rejection. 56 All applicants are entitled to some form of review of the rejection. 5 " When an application for federal preference, which often will determine admissibility, is denied, the applicant is entitled only to notice and an opportunity to meet with some person, who may even be a subordinate of the person who made the original denial." These procedures are not very substantial.
Schill and Wachter assert that "the ability of PHAs to screen out potentially troublesome tenants has been reduced as has their power to evict those harmful to the community." 5 9 In fact, however, PHAs retain ample authority to screen and to evict persons "harmful to the community." The procedural protections for tenants threatened with eviction are eliminated for tenants accused of conduct harmful to others. So long as a due process court proceeding is available, no grievance procedure is required for evictions premised on alleged drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises or other criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or PHA employees. 6°' These rights are grounded in constitutional due process requirements. See Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254(1970) Supp. V 1993) ; 24 C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i) (1994) (providing that a PHA may exclude from its administrative procedure any grievance involving eviction based on either "criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other residents or employees of the PHA" or "drug-related criminal activity"); see also HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 39, § 13.2.4.2, at 13/5 to 13/7 (discussing these exceptions to ordinary PHA grievance procedure).
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There are substantive constraints on admissions and evictions. PHAs are not permitted to condition admission or continued occupancy upon per se status standards. Thus, PHAs are not permitted to exclude an applicant for being an unwed mother or a single parent. 61 These standards apply by handbook or by contract to most of the other housing programs.
62
" [S] o long as status discrimination and Fair Housing Act violations are avoided and applicable federal preferences are applied," 6 " however, PHAs and other landlords have broad discretion to condition admission and continued occupancy upon satisfaction of "desirability" standards.
Eviction from subsidized housing involves loss of two important interests: a home and a financial contribution to the cost of housing. The importance of the interests is the basis for requiring notice and an opportunity for a minimal due process hearing before these interests can be lost. Lesser protections have been accorded applicants.
The protections are strongest where government involvement is greatest.
These protections cannot explain why more poor people are in public housing than in other kinds of subsidized housing. First, the fundamental notions of notice, fair consideration, and rational standards apply to all the programs. Second, the more elaborate provisions that govern PHA decisions, especially eviction, are inapplicable to allegations of criminal conduct, which in any event is not synonymous with poverty. Third, the substantive constraintthe requirement of good cause for action-allows PHAs broad discretion in admission and evictions. If there were no procedural and substantive protections, if PHAs could reject and evict with complete arbitrariness, public housing still would have the greatest concentrations of very poor people, because people of color, who disproportionately are poor, are excluded from other subsidized housing programs.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY RATES
Schill and Wachter seek to suggest that large public housing developments for families cause neighborhood blight. They show that in Philadelphia such projects are located in neighborhoods with undesirable conditions. In response, I make two observations. First, as Schill and Wachter emphasize, the public housing about which they write is large, multi-unit developments, and it is housing for families with children, not for elderly persons. Thus, their discussion does not pertain to low-rise, garden apartments or singlefamily housing, which together comprise 73% of total public housing.
69
Nothing in the Schill and Wachter article would homelessness unit actually obtained. Id.; see also id. at 188 (stating that "PHAs...
[may legally] reject potential tenants based on any type of criminal record, problems with misbehaving children, poor landlord references, history of difficulties in paying rent, or even allegations of messy housekeeping").
" See STEGMAN, supra note 34, at 51 ("UJlust 27 percent of all public housing developments are high-rise buildings; 32 percent are garden apartments; 16 percent are low-rise, walk-up apartments; and 25 percent are single-family or townhouse struc-
1995]
support those who oppose placing single-family scattered-site public housing units in better-served communities.
7 0
Second, Schill and Wachter demonstrate that in Philadelphia the location of large public housing developments for families strongly correlates with undesirable neighborhood conditions, but they do not prove that those public housing developments cause the undesirable neighborhood conditions. HUD and local governments put large public housing family developments into minority neighborhoods that lacked the political power to prevent being the object of municipal "dumping." For the same reasons, minority neighborhoods also suffer from diminished and degraded public services. The presence of large public housing developments and poor neighborhood conditions stem from the same cause; one does not cause the other. The Schill and Wachter regression analysis shows that many more poor families reside in Philadelphia census tracts with large numbers of public housing units than in Philadelphia census tracts without much public housing.
72 This is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that public housing placement and high poverty are effects of another cause.
Massey and Denton suggest racial segregation as a principal cause, 73 while economists George Galster and Ronald Mincy suggest that job growth and location are others. 74 HUD's recent report strongly suggests racial discrimina- Feb. 7, 1995) (remedial order affecting DHA), at 1, 7 (acknowledging that a vestige of past discrimination pervades the Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) public housing projects in that 92% of black, nonelderly households are in segregated areas where the poverty rate exceeds 40%, and these units, projects, and neighborhoods are "substantially inferior to the conditions in which low income whites receive HUD assistance"). tion as the cause: "[T]he majority of African Americans living in public housing projects in the United States are living in povertyconcentrated areas, while the majority of public housing white tenants-both families and the elderly-are living in neighborhoods with substantially lower poverty rates."
75
Large public housing developments for families need not cause neighborhood blight. The architecture is not at fault: many upperincome people, predominantly white, including families with children, live comfortably in large, high-rise buildings in upper-scale neighborhoods of New York and other cities. Concentration of poverty is not the crucial element: very poor people can live decently in large, high-rise buildings without blighting their neighborhoods-so long as the very poor people are white and elderly. Public housing for families does not necessarily blight surrounding neighborhoods: as Schill and Wachter report, studies show that the presence of public housing does not diminish surrounding property values. 6 In Montgomery County, Maryland, when public housing units were incorporated into high-income subdivision developments, property values in those developments increased more than in comparable developments without the public housing units. 77 What is crucial in Montgomery County is that the housing is racially and economically integrated. In general, neighborhood blight becomes an issue only when the public housing development is very large and the residents are all nonwhite, very poor families with children.
III. CURRENT POLICIES: THE ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENT
Schill and Wachter attack the statutory requirement of one-forone replacement for any public housing units demolished.
7 1 "The effects of the one-for-one replacement requirement," they write, "have been pernicious for many inner-city communities. PHAs, lacking the money to build new units or renovate existing developments, have often been forced to retain deteriorated or vacant projects rather than demolish them." 7 I want to offer a gloss on that: it is not the one-for-one replacement requirement that is at 75 GOERING, supra note 25, at 31. 
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fault; it is noncompliance with the one-for-one requirement. Schill and Wachter's real argument is not against the one-for-one requirement, but against implementation of the requirement in a way that discourages replacement or rehabilitation of severely distressed public housing. Five issues have plagued the one-for-one replacement debate. The first is whether subsidized units should be replaced at all. Those who deplore federal provision of housing subsidies obviously would welcome a diminution of the subsidized housing stock. Certainly, this is not Schill and Wachter's position. If one takes the view that the government should subsidize housing for people who cannot otherwise secure decent housing, the one-for-one requirement is beneficent, not pernicious: it assures that the precious stock of housing subsidies will not be diminished. Given that the government currently provides housing subsidies to only one in three poverty-level families,
8
" housing subsidies need to be increased, not reduced.
The second issue is whether replacement should be by "hard" public housing units or by certificates or vouchers. "Hard" units have the virtue of long-term availability; certificates and vouchers are short-lived. "Hard" units also are more likely to include three-, four-, and five-bedroom units needed by large, low-income families. "Hard" units add to the stock of community-owned housing, while certificates and vouchers merely help pay rent."' Certificates and vouchers, on the other hand, have the virtues of allowing choice and dispersal; they can enable racial and economic integration in jurisdictions in which PHAs might not be able to build units. This last virtue makes certificates and vouchers especially attractive to some and especially odious to others. 8 See, e.g., Karen de Witt, Housing Voucher Test in Maiyland Is Scuttled by a Political Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at B10. opposition for their capacity to undo or exacerbate segregation, replacement by "hard" public housing units poses the issue even more strongly. HUD's current Site and Neighborhood Standard regulation on its face favors siting in nonsegregated, nonimpacted areas, 3 although in reality the exceptions to the regulation have swallowed the general rule, and replacement units have been approved for segregated, poverty-concentrated locations. 4 In many situations, funding is available, but the actual provision of the replacement units is delayed because of political opposition to the siting of public housing units. In New Haven, Connecticut, for example, funding was available for replacement of the Elm Haven high-rise with scattered-site public housing, to be constructed or acquired in nonsegregated neighborhoods; although suitable sites were identified promptly, many years elapsed without significant progress toward replacing the units. 8 5 As this example suggests, a principal obstacle to replacing units is opposition to having black public housing residents living in nonsegregated, nonghetto neighborhoods. The opposition is to the people, regardless of the kind of housing in which they live. The opposition is not to the people's poverty: poor white people live in those neighborhoods without hindrance. The opposition is to the race and color of the would-be residents.
The fourth issue has been funding. Congress never has appropriated enough money to repair or replace all severely distressed public housing, and Congress has not allowed PHAs a free hand in allocating money between modernization and demolition/replacement.
The final issue has been competence. While some PHAs have done a very good job of modernization and demolition with replacement, others have allowed funding to stand unused.
Each of these issues demands its own solution, and the problem and solutions will differ for each public housing development in each community. More flexibility to use funding for replacement rather than modernization and for certificates and vouchers rather than hard units would be welcome. to be unacceptable is elimination of the one-for-one replacement requirement. What that would achieve is simply elimination of subsidized units. Schill and Wachter's central point is that the worst result is keeping "deteriorated or vacant projects." I disagree. I think the worst result would be to eliminate the "deteriorated or vacant projects" without requiring that the subsidies be replaced, one for one, with whatever combination of "hard" units or certificates or vouchers would best produce decent housing with genuine free choice of location. The real solution to the problem of highrises that should be demolished is an effective program of replacing these units with scattered-site units and certificates or vouchers in nonsegregated, nonpoor neighborhoods. In the current political context, discussing the one-for-one replacement requirement is quite removed from reality: this Congress is likely to eliminate the requirement altogether. If the requirement should be eliminated, proposed demolitions will be challenged as violations of the constitutional and statutory civil rights obligations: the decision to demolish without replacement projects that housed minorities raises obvious civil rights issues. A lawful, humane, and responsible subsidized housing policy would honor the fundamental principle that the one-for-one requirement embodies: the need to increase, and certainly not to decrease, the quantity of decent, desegregative, subsidized housing opportunities for low-income people.
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IV. SOLUTIONS Schill and Wachter offer four solutions to the problem of concentrated poverty in public housing. Their proposals are: increasing fair housing enforcement, removing land use barriers that inhibit the production of affordable housing, changing several aspects of the current public housing program, and expanding housing mobility programs. I agree with them only about the last. RULE 11 (1995) ("To assist housing authorities to make the best use of the resources at their disposal, the Congress should consider giving the Secretary of HUD the flexibility to approve alternative approaches to replacing nonviable housing that has been demolished or sold.").
"
The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Affordable Housing urged that "no privatization effort should be undertaken without a clear commitment that every unit lost to the public housing stock will be replaced on a unit-for-unit basis." STEGMAN, supra note 34, at 16.
A. Fair Housing Enforcement
Fair housing enforcement alone is not a tool for deconcentrating poverty. Most fair housing enforcement is driven by individual complaints, and a disproportionate amount of the enforcement activity is on behalf of persons with disabilities and families with children rather than on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities. 8 8 Even when the complaints are of racial or ethnic discrimination, they are unlikely to come from very poor people. Relatively few poor people of color have the time, confidence, and psychic energy to pursue fair housing complaints.
Fair lending is of questionable utility for deconcentrating poverty. Schill and Wachter perform a very useful function in separating three distinct but related issues: to whom is the money being loaned, for what purpose is it being loaned, and in which neighborhoods will it be used? It is not enough to say that more money should be loaned to people of color or for minority neighborhoods: lending money to build more housing in those neighborhoods will not likely contribute to desegregation; lending more money to enable people to leave those neighborhoods will not promote deconcentration of poverty. Fair lending for single-family homeownership is a program directed at moderate-or middleincome blacks, not at very poor people: very poor people cannot afford homeownership in cities. If "fair lending" increases black homeownership in minority neighborhoods, it exacerbates racial concentration. If it enables blacks to move to white neighborhoods, it exacerbates poverty concentration by leaving poor blacks behind. In the relatively unusual event that fair lending programs enable higher-income whites to move to poor black neighborhoods, desegregation and deconcentration would occur at the expense of poor black people. Loans directed towards minority neighborhoods may be desirable, and they may promote physical improvement of the neighborhoods, but they are not tools for deconcentration and desegregation.
" See James A. Kushner, Federal Enforcement andJudicial Review of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 , 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 537, 565-66 & nn.162-63 (1992 (warning that fewer administrative enforcement resources will be available to combat traditional racial and ethnic discrimination because of a substantial increase in familial and disability bias claims).
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B. Land Use Regulation
Encouraging affordable housing development alone will not do much to deconcentrate poverty.
Shallow-subsidy, affordable housing reduces the cost of housing only by a relatively small amount; it cannot, standing alone, deconcentrate poor areas. Indeed, developing shallow-subsidy, affordable housing programs that include genuine fair housing principles might well enable moderate-income people to leave poor areas, thereby further isolating and concentrating people who are poor. This is not to say that affordable housing should not be constructed; rather, it is to insist that, to achieve deconcentration, affordable housing construction must be linked to both deeper subsidies and desegregative action. The provision of a deep subsidy is crucial to enable very poor people of color to move to nonpoor areas. Schill and Wachter suggest that providing shallow-subsidy units in higher-income white areas can achieve deconcentration and desegregation because poor blacks will use demand-side subsidies-Section 8 certificates and vouchers-to move to these units. Experience shows, however, that that linkage is unlikely to be made unless it is required by law. The shallow-subsidy developments that now exist in white areas have not achieved racial desegregation, despite civil rights laws, including HUD's Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations.
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C. Changes in the Housing Programs
Schill and Wachter fault the public housing program for concentrating poverty; I fault the other housing programs for excluding most poor people. Schill and Wachter propose changes to public housing; I maintain that solving the problems of public housing will require changes in other housing programs. Alternative housing must be made available to the very poor for whom public housing is now the only significant option. If public housing remains the only viable option for the thirteen million poor households in the United States, it will continue to be a source of concentrated poverty. If we are not willing to end poverty but want to deconcentrate it, we must make it possible for poor people to live in places other than public housing.
" See Schill & Wachter, supra note 1, at 1335-36; see also Michael H. Schill, Race, the Underclass, and Public Policy, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY, 433, 453 (1994) .
90
See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 (discussing HUD's complicity in perpetuating segregation).
program succeeds despite the fact that the families do not receive educational counseling or supplemental assistance with employment, child care, transportation, or other problems. 1 0 2 "A program that provided such support might produce even more encouraging results."
1 0 3
CONCLUSION
We should not have thirteen million very poor families in the United States, but we do. If we cannot alleviate their poverty, we must at least provide them with the opportunity to live in decent housing. Public housing has been virtually the only program available to these very poor families. We must open the rest of the housing stock, especially in previously "white" areas, to welcome and include these families. As we provide additional housing opportunities, we must also improve the conditions in public housing and the neighborhoods in which such housing is located. Nothing less than our humanity and our civilization are at risk if we shirk this duty.
